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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CORPORATION, a 
New York corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, et al., 
Defendants. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, et al., 
Cross-claimants, 
vs. 
TYE STATE TAX COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, et al., 
Cross-defendants. 
Case No. 18972 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT/CROSS DEFENDANT 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case involves an action by plaintiff, Kennecott Cor-
poration, challenging the constitutionality of two tax 
statutes passed by the Utah Legislature in 1981. Defendant, 
Salt Lake County, counterclaimed against plaintiff, alleging 
that plaintiff's mining property had been undervalued and 
that some of its property had escaped valuation. Salt Lake 
County also filed crossclaims against the Utah State Tax Com-
mission in which it contested certain valuation techniq11< 
employed by the Commission and in which it sought review ol 
confidential Commission records. 
DISPOSITION BY THE LOWER COURT 
Following a hearing on motions for summary judgment filed 
by plaintiff and the State Tax Commission with respect to 
Salt Lake County's counterclaim and crossclaims, the lower 
court granted judgment in favor of plaintiff and the Commis-
sion. The court ruled that Salt Lake County did not have 
standing to maintain any of its causes of action and dis-
missed the county's claims against respondents. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent, Utah State Tax Commission, seeks affirmance 
of the lower court's judgment of dismissal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND NATURE OF CLAIMS 
For purposes of appeal, the facts in the present case are 
essentially as set forth in appellants' brief and relate pri-
marily to the claims asserted by the parties and the proceed-
ings before the lower court. However, some clarification is 
necessary in order to summarize fully the position of the 
State Tax Commission before the lower court. 
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i\ppellants, Salt Lake County, the Salt Lake county 
rr2cis1ner and the Salt Lake County Assessor (hereinafter the 
"County"), asserted two claims for relief against the Utah 
rax Com:nission (hereinafter the "Commission"). Their first 
cause of action alleged that the Commission had undervalued 
plaintiff's mining properties and that the court should issue 
an order requiring the Commission to disregard the provisions 
of Utah Code Annotated § 59-5-57 (1953, as amended), relating 
to the procedures for valuing certain mining properties, and 
to revalue the property of Kennecott Corporation (hereinafter 
"Kennecott") for each of the past five years. The County 
further sought a judgment declaring that Section 59-5-57 of 
the Utah Code was unconstitutional. The second cause of 
action requested the court to order the Commission to main-
tain a book of mines and to supply to the County, upon 
request, all information relating to the valuation of state-
assessed property within the County. Appellants' counter-
claim against Kennecott alleged that Kennecott's property had 
been undervalued by the Commission and that Kennecott should 
be ordered to pay an additional tax based upon a proper 
value. The basic issues raised by this appeal, therefore, 
are whether a county has standing to challenge a property 
valuation required by statute to be made by the Commission 
and to audit Commission records in cases where a taxpayer 
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appeals to the courts from that valuation, and whether a 
county has the right to seek a court order requiring the c0 ,,, 
mission to increase the assessed value of the taxpayer's 
property. 
In this regard, the Commission took the position before 
the lower court that the counties and their agencies and 
officers, as well as other political subdivisions and agen-
cies of the state, could sue only within the framework of 
specific powers granted to them by the Utah Constitution or 
by the legislature. Since there is no specific grant of 
power to the County to assert the above claims, the Commis-
sion maintained that appellants had no standing to assert 
them in this or any other action. The Commission also con-
tended that the County was not entitled to maintain its 
second cause of action for the additional reason that both 
the taxpayer's constitutional right of privacy and the Utah 
Archives and Records Service Information Practices Act pre-
cluded disclosure to the County of the above information. 
The Commission did not assert that the relationship between 
the Commission and the County was equivalent to that of a 
•servant-master" as stated by the County in its brief. 
(Brief of Appellants, page 7). 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THB COUNTY LACKS STANDING TO MAINTAIN ANY 
CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE UTAH TAX COM-
MISSION IN THE PRESENT ACTION, 
A. Utah Constitution and Statutes. 
With respect to each of the County's causes of action, a 
review of applicable law shows that to grant the relief re-
quested by appellant would give powers to the counties, which 
neither the framers of the Utah Constitution nor the legisla-
ture ever intended the counties to have. It would further 
usurp express constitutional and statutory powers of the Tax 
Commission. Article XIII, Section 11, of the Utah Constitu-
tion provides for the creation of the Commission and requires 
the Commission to administer and supervise the tax laws of 
the state, to assess or value mines and public utilities, and 
to adjust and equalize the valuation and assessment among the 
several counties. Section 59-5-3 of the Utah Code Annotated 
also specifically requires the Commission to assess pipe-
lines, power lines and plants, canals and irrigation works, 
bridges and ferries, car and transportation companies oper-
ating in more than one county, and mines and mining claims. 
(These classes of property will be referred to throughout 
this brief as "state-assessed property".) It then provides 
that taxable property not required by the Constitution or by 
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law to be assessed by the Commission must be assessed by 
county assessor of the county in which the property is situ 
ated. (Such property is hereinafter ref erred to as "county-
assessed property".) Thus, the Constitution and state law 
specifically provide that certain kinds of taxable property, 
including property owned by Kennecott, is to be assessed by 
the Commission, and that the duty of the counties with 
respect to assessment of taxable property is limited to 
assessment of those properties within their boundaries, which 
is not assessed by the Commission. 
With respect to the Commission's constitutional duty to 
administer and supervise the tax laws of the state, Utah Code 
Annotated, S 59-5-46(9) (1953, as amended) requires the Com-
mission to exercise general supervision "over assessors and 
over county boards in the performance of their duties as 
county boards of equalization and over other county officers 
in the performance of their duties in connection with the 
assessment of property and collection of taxes." The nature 
and extent of the Commission's power and authority are also 
seen in Section 59-5-47, which provides: 
The State Tax Commission shall adjust and equalize 
the valuation of the taxable property in the several 
counties of the state for the purpose of taxation: 
and to that end it may of its own initiative order 
or make an assessment or reassessment of any prop-
erty which it deems to have been overassessed or 
underassessed or which it finds has not been 
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. . . fN]o county board of equalization 
or assessor shall have any power to change any 
assessment so fixed by the State Tax Commission. 
The overall responsibility for administration of the 
state's tax laws and, in particular, for assessment of tax-
able property, therefore, rests with the Commission. It is 
the only state agency that is charged with the statutory 
responsibility of ensuring that the counties carry out their 
duties properly in this regard. The reasons for this dis-
tinction between the constitutional and statutory powers of 
the Commission and the counties are based on a clear legisla-
tive recognition of a need for administrative efficiency and 
order in the taxation of all property throughout the state. 
The procedures for taxing real property could not be carried 
out effectively or economically if the counties had the right 
to sue the Commission or challenge its action in all cases 
where a county disagrees with the Commission's valuations, 
policies or procedures. Only the legislature can grant such 
a right after careful review of appropriate safeguards, the 
need to provide funding for additional personnel and expert 
witnesses, and similar considerations. 
In contrast to the above specific constitutional and 
statutory requirements, the county now seeks to turn the 
above procedures and laws upside down and to supervise and 
direct the Commission in the performance of its constitution-
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al and statutory duties with respect to the assessment of all 
taxable property throughout the state. Its approach first 1, 
to require not only reassessment of state-assessed propertieo 
in Salt Lake County, but a change in the statutory method set 
forth in Section 59-5-57 by which certain mining properties 
are assessed statewide. Second, the County seeks access to 
all information relating to such assessments required to be 
made exclusively by the Commission so that it can look over 
the shoulder of the Commission as it performs its constitu-
tional duties. In short, as reflected by its brief, the 
County seeks a court appointment as "watchdog" over the Com-
mission. (Brief of Appellants, pages 19-20). 
Under state law governing appellants' claims, there are 
only two avenues by which parties may challenge assessments 
made by the Commission on property which it is required to 
assess by law. First, Utah Code Annotated, S 59-11-11 (1953, 
as amended) provides that a taxpayer may pay under protest a 
tax with which he disagrees and then bring an action in court 
to recover the amount paid under protest. Kennecott's action 
in the present case was brought under this provision. The 
provision would also permit an owner of county-assessed prop-
erty or a group of such owners to bring an action in district 
court to challenge valuation procedures of the Commission and 
to obtain a refund if those procedures result in the payment 
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.,f a greater tax due to undervaluation of state-assessed 
property. Alternatively, a property owner dissatisfied with 
dn assessment made by the Commission may apply to the Com-
mission for correction of the assessment, and the Commission 
will then set a time to hear the objection. Utah Code 
Annotated, § 59-7-13 (1953, as amended). If a taxpayer is 
dissatisfied with the decision of the Commission, he may then 
appeal to the tax division of the appropriate district court 
for review of the Commission's decision or, in the alterna-
tive, may apply for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme 
Court. § 59-24-2. Under both procedures, the only party 
for whom provision is made for appeal of an assessment made 
by the Commission on state-assessed property is the taxpayer 
himself; there is no provision made for such an appeal by a 
county, its officers or agencies. 
Additionally, state law provides no rights to the coun-
ties and their officers and agencies with respect to the book 
of mines referred to in Section 59-5-56 of the Utah Code, and 
makes no provision for any person or entity, other than the 
Commission, to have any access whatsoever to the information 
sought by appellants' second cause of action. Indeed, as 
will be discussed below, the Archives and Records Service 
Information Practices Act expressly prohibits the dissemina-
tion of such information. 
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In summary, the Commission is vested with the exclusi 
constitutional and statutory power and authority to valuP 
state-assessed property. As to such property, neither the 
Utah Constitution nor state statutes give the counties any 
responsibility, powers or authority whatever. Section 
59-5-46(9) expressly grants to the Commission general super-
visory powers over the administration of the tax laws of the 
state, including assessors and county boards in the perfor-
mance of their duties, and over other county officers in con-
nection with the assessment of property and collection of 
taxes. Section 59-5-47 of the Utah Code states specifically 
that the counties have no power to change any reassessments 
made by the Commission of county-assessed property. A simi-
lar limitation should apply to cases in which a county claims 
it has power to challenge the Commission's valuation of 
state-assessed property. 
B. The Courts Have Refused to Grant Standing to Coun-
ties to Sue Under Similar Circumstances. 
Counties and other political subdivisions of a state have 
only such powers as are expressly conferred upon them by 
statute or by the state constitution and those which are 
reasonably and necessarily implied therefrom. State v. 
Hutchinson, 624 P.2d 1116 (Utah 1980) 1 Gardner v. Davis 
County, 523 P. 2d 865 (Utah 1974); Cottonwood City Electors v. 
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dt Lake County Bd. of Com'rs, 499 P.2d 270 (Utah 1972); 
Johnson v. Sandy City Corp., 497 P.2d 644 (Utah 
1972); Ritholz v. City of Salt Lake, 2B4 P.2d 702 (Utah 
1955); Salt Lake City v. Revene, 124 P.2d 537 (Utah 1942). 
This rule is particularly applicable where the public 
treasury is directly affected. Barendregt v. Walla Walla 
School District No. 140, 611 P.2d 13B5 (Wash. App. 19BO); 
State ex rel. Bain v. Clallam County Board of County Commis-
sioners, 463 P.2d 617 (Wash. 1970). In addition, county com-
missions and county officials have only such powers as are 
specifically enunciated by law and those which are reasonably 
and necessarily implied in order to discharge their responsi-
bilities. Gardner v. Davis County, 523 P.2d B65 (Utah 1974); 
Cottonwood City Electors v. Salt Lake County Board of Commis-
sioners, 499 P.2d 270 (Utah 1972). 
While it may be argued that Utah Code Annotated, 
§ 17-4-3(1) (1953, as amended) grants counties power to sue 
and be sued, this is not a blanket power to sue under all 
circumstances. As stated by this Court in Shaw v. Salt Lake 
County, 224 P. 2d 1037, 103B (Utah 1950): 
Section 19-4-3, u.c.A. 1943 [the predecessor of 
u.c.A., s 17-4-3], covering the general powers of 
counties indicates that "A County has power: (1) To 
sue and be sued." This, however, is but a general 
grant constituting the county an entity to sue and 
be sued, where it may under other applicable 
statutes or principles, properly be sued or sue. 
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Accordingly, without specific constitutional or statutory 
power to sue for a particular kind of relief, the counties 
and their officials have no standing or authority to do so. 
The specific question of whether a county has standing to 
sue the Commission to challenge an assessment made by the 
Commission or to test the constitutionality of a statute 
under which the Commission has performed its constitutional 
duties does not appear to have been raised in any reported 
decision of this Court. However, the question of standing 
was addressed by the Court briefly in response to a recent 
petition filed in the cases of Beaver County, et al. v. Utah 
State Tax Commission, Case Nos. 18672, 18673, and 18674 
(1982) , in which all 29 Utah counties sought an order of this 
Court, requiring the Commission to permit the counties to 
intervene in several taxpayer appeals before the Commission. 
In each of those cases, a railroad company had appealed from 
the Commission's valuation of its property. The Commission 
moved to dismiss the counties' petitions because the valua-
tion of state-assessed property was the exclusive statutory 
responsibility of the Commission and the counties lacked 
standing to challenge those valuations. In a notice of deci-
sion dated October 22, 1982, the Court stated that •defen-
dant's motion to dismiss is granted, petitioners being with-
out standing to intervene.• 
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The Court's ruling in Beaver County is consistent with 
court decisions of neighboring states, which have held unani-
mously that counties and their officials have no standing or 
authority to bring such lawsuits. In Board of County Com-
missioners of County of Delores v. Love, 470 P.2d 861 (Colo. 
1970), for example, the plaintiffs, who were county offi-
cials, claimed that the State Board of Equalization and the 
Colorado Tax Commission had abused their discretion in 
reviewing property appraisals of the Delores County Assessor 
and in ordering reappraisals of county properties. The 
Colorado Supreme Court dismissed plaintiffs' complaint, 
holding that the plaintiff county officials had neither 
standing nor legal authority to maintain their action. 
The principles relied upon by the Court in Board of 
County Commissioners in reaching its decision are generally 
the same as those set forth under Point I above and apply 
equally to the County's claims in the present case. First, 
the Court noted that a county is not an independent govern-
mental entity, but rather a political subdivision of the 
state, existing only for the convenient administration of 
state government and created to carry out the will of the 
state. Further, the counties and their agencies and offi-
cers, as subdivisions of the state, possess only 
such powers as are expressly conferred upon them by the 
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constitution and statutes and such incidental and irnpliel 
powers as are reasonably necessary to carry out their 
powers. The Court found that in Colorado (as in Utah) no 
statutory or constitutional provision grants any express or 
implied powers to counties or county agencies or officials to 
challenge the findings, orders or other action of a State Tax 
Commission. Therefore, the Court held that the counties had 
no standing to maintain such action. 
The second point made in Board of County Commissioners is 
that the general grant of power to the counties to sue 
relates to the county's function as a body corporate and can 
only be exercised within the framework of the specific powers 
granted counties and boards of county commissioners. It does 
not grant a general power to sue in all situations. The 
position of the Colorado Supreme Court in this regard is con-
sistent with the holding of the Utah Supreme Court in Shaw v. 
Salt Lake County, 224 P. 2d 1037, 1038 (Utah 1950), as dis-
cussed above. 
Third, the Court in Board of County Commissioners held 
that county commissioners or agencies do not have authority 
to sue as representatives of the taxpayers of their coun-
ties. The Arizona Supreme Court in Town of Chino Valley v. 
State Land Department, 580 P. 2d 704 (Ariz. 1978), also stated 
that municipalities were a creation of the state and were not 
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a1npowered to invoke the personal rights of its citizens 
against the state. 
Finally, the Court in Board of County Commissioners 
emphasized that a ministerial officer, such as an assessor, 
is required to obey the act of a tribunal in directing his 
action, and may not question or decide upon its validity. 
The Court stated that an assessor has no more standing to 
question the validity of the action of a state board of 
equalization than a lower court has to question the validity 
of the mandate of a reviewing Court. That principle should 
apply with equal force in the present case to prevent the 
counties from challenging the action of the Commission, par-
ticularly in view of Utah Code Annotated, Section 59-5-46(9), 
which expressly provides that the Commission is to exercise 
general supervision over county assessors and county boards 
of equalization. 
In the later case of Adams County Board of County Commis-
sioners v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 525 P.2d 1202 
(Colo. App. 1974), the Colorado Court of Appeals held that a 
county assessor and a county board of commissioners had 
neither standing nor authority to seek review of a decision 
of the State Board of Assessment Appeals (the successor 
agency to the Colorado Tax Commission) • As in Board of 
County Commissioners, the Court explained that the county 
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assessor and county board of commissioners were precluded 
from challenging a decision of the State Board of Assessmen1 
Appeals without specific legislation granting them the power 
to do so. Although Adams does not deal specifically with the 
question of whether a county has standing to challenge valua-
tion procedures used by a State Tax Commission, the principle 
that counties cannot exceed their statutory authority is 
equally applicable to the present case. 
In Petit v. Board of Tax Appeals, 538 P.2d 501 (Wash. 
1975), the Supreme Court of Washington also held that a 
county assessor was not entitled to judicial review of a 
decision of the State Board of Tax Appeals. The Court ex-
plained that parties entitled to such review were limited to 
those expressly given that right by statute. Therefore, only 
taxpayers and not tax assessors were entitled to seek judi-
cial review of a Board of Tax Appeals decision. Similarly, 
in King County v. Washington State Board of Tax Appeals, 622 
P.2d 898 (Wash. App. 1981), the Washington Court of Appeals 
held that a county and its assessor lack standing to seek a 
statutory writ of certiorari to challenge a Board of Tax 
Appeals decision. Again the Court reached this decision on 
the ground that a county's powers are limited to those ex-
pressly or impliedly derived from the legislature: 
-16-
The appellants argue that the BTA [Board of Tax 
Appeals] rulings infringe on the county's constitu-
tionally recognized power to collect taxes. The 
appellants concede that this taxing power is derived 
only from legislative grant. They contend, however, 
that, once this grant has been made, the county has 
a sufficient interest in defending its taxing power 
to allow it to seek review of BTA decisions that 
limit it. Appellants do not mention that a grant of 
taxing power does not confer an absolute right to 
collect property taxes free from state interfer-
ence. The actions of the assessor are subject to 
state supervision. Furthermore, the State "can take 
away not only the power to tax, but the subjects of 
taxation as well. No person or municipality can 
acquire, as against the state, a vested right to 
tax. • • " Authority to make omitted value assess-
ments, the primary issues in these cases, is not a 
constitutional right of the assessor, but is derived 
from [state statutes]. The BTA has authority to 
decide appeals from a county board of equalization 
under [a state statute] and was thus empowered to 
rule against the appellants in these cases. [Cita-
tions omitted] 
Id. at 901. 
Other courts, based on similar considerations, have held 
that a county and its officers may not challenge the consti-
tutionality of a state statute without specific statutory 
authority to do so. Denver Urban Renewal Authority v. Byrne, 
618 P. 2d 1374 (Colo. 1980); Board of County Com.missioners of 
Boulder County v. 5lst General Assembly of the State of 
Colorado, 599 P.2d 887 (Colo. 1979); Denver Association for 
Retarded Children, Inc. v. School District No. 1, 535 P.2d 
200 (Colo. 1975). This rule was explained in Denver Urban 
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Renewal Authority v. Byrne, 618 P.2d 1374, 1379 (Colo. \'J8111 
as follows: 
A longstanding rule of law is that political 
subdivisions of the state, and the officers thereof, 
lack standing to challenge the constitutionality of 
a state statute directing the performance of their 
duties. This rule has been applied to counties, 
county officials, and county agencies; and also has 
been applied with respect to school districts. The 
rationale for this rule is that [p]ublic policy and 
public necessity require prompt and efficient action 
from [ministerial officers of the state. J It has 
similarly been noted that subordinate state politi-
cal subdivisions, or their officers, may not chal-
lenge a state statute unless expressly or impliedly 
empowered to do so. Board of Commissioners 
v. r..ove [discussed above], wherein it also stated 
that such political subdivisions of the state exist 
only for the convenient administration of the state 
government, created to carry out the will of the 
state. [Citations omitted] 
For the reasons stated by the courts in the above deci-
sions, appellants in the present case lack standing to chal-
lenge not only the valuations made by the Commission, but 
also the constitutionality of Section 59-5-57 of the Utah 
Code. The same reasoning compels a finding that the County 
lacks standing to maintain its second cause of action, which 
seeks an order requiring the Commission to maintain a book of 
mines and to give Salt Lake County all information, including 
informational returns filed by plaintiff and all other owners 
of state-asessed property located in Salt Lake county. 
Appellants have not cited any cases or other authority in 
which the issue of standing was raised and in which a county 
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or county official was granted standing to challenge in court 
" State Tax Commission decision or procedure, absent a speci-
fic statutory grant of power to do so. 
The Utah Constitution and state statutes expressly pro-
vide that the Commission has exclusive authority to value 
state-assessed property. County-assessed properties, in con-
trast, are valued by the counties. Again, it is significant 
for purposes of this appeal, that the Commission is required 
by law to supervise the counties in the performance of their 
tax responsibilities. At the time the County filed its 
crossclaim in the present action, the counties had no statu-
tory right to challenge any decisions or procedures of the 
commission. It was only after the lower court ruled in 
respondents' favor that the counties submitted proposed 
legislation to obtain standing to get involved in appeals 
before the Commission and subsequent court proceedings based 
on those appeals. Even then, the legislature limited the 
standing of the counties to certain situations and did not 
grant a broad power to challenge all Commission decisions or 
proceedings. See copies of Senate Bills Nos. 184 and 208 
attached hereto as Appendix •A". Passage of these bills con-
stitutes legislative recognition that counties can operate 
only within the scope of powers granted to them by the legis-
lature and that the counties did not have power or standing 
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to challenge Commission valuations of state-assessed properi 
in any way prior to adoption of these limited standing 
statutes. 
It would be improper in light of the Utah constitution 
and statutes in existence when the present action was filed 
to conclude that the counties had a right to sue the Commis-
sion to contest its valuation procedures. The legislature, 
as seen from a reading of applicable tax statutes as a whole, 
clearly intended and recognized that the Commission could 
carry out its supervisory functions without the direction, 
supervision and second guessing of the counties, each of 
which could be motivated by very different and conflicting 
interests and objectives. Under existing statutes, the coun-
ties also had no power to gain access to information used by 
the Commission in discharging its constitutional duties, 
including the valuation of state-assessed properties. Nor 
did they have any statutory right to file legal proceedings 
to challenge the record-keeping practices and procedures 
employed by the Commission. The County's allegation that 
they have the right and duty to make such challenges and to 
obtain such information is founded on a misunderstanding of 
their constitutional and statutory powers and is not sup-
ported by the law. Only with full consideration by the 
legislature of the questions of adequate safeguards, funding, 
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s·oi>e of involvement, efficiency of administration and other 
1 •. -tors, should the counties be granted standing to get in-
volved in state-assessed property functions of the Commis-
sion. Such questions were reviewed by the 1983 session of 
the legislature when it granted the counties limited standing 
to file court action against the Commission, only after the 
counties had exhausted their administrative remedies before 
the Commission and only within specific time limitations. In 
the absence of such legislation, the courts should not grant 
standing to the counties to permit them to challenge actions 
expressly required of state agencies and in which the coun-
ties have no statutory responsibility. 
POINT II 
THE AUTHORITIES CITED BY APPELLANTS DO NOT 
SUPPORT THEIR POSITION THAT THEY HAVE 
STANDING TO CHALLENGE VALUATIONS MADE BY 
THE STATE TAX 
Appellants have cited several early Utah cases in support 
of their position that they have standing to challenge action 
taken by the Commission. The issue of standing, however, was 
not raised or discussed in any of those cases and, in any 
event, all of the cases involved procedural issues arising 
out of tax matters subject to concurrent state-county juris-
diction. Several of the cases also involved taxpayers who 
were parties to the action. 
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Appellants contend initially that the Commission's sL,nl 
ing argument relies on "Dillon's Rule,• which was 
by this court in State v. Hutchinson, 624 P.2d 1116 (Utah 
1980). (Brief of Appellants, page 30). Hutchinson, however, 
does not apply to the issues before the Court in the present 
case, since it holds only that when the state by statute 
grants general welfare power to local governments, those 
governments have authority beyond specific grants of power to 
pass ordinances reasonably related to the objectives of the 
general welfare power. Id. at 1126. In contrast, the 
present case calls into question the counties' standing to 
take legal action to challenge the Commission's exercise of 
its statutory and constitutional duties to value specified 
classes of property where no statute gives the counties any 
power or responsibility with respect to the valuation of 
those properties. 
Appellants also cite Salt Lake County v. State Board of 
Equalization, 55 P. 378 (Utah 1889), Juab County v. Bailey, 
140 P. 764 (Utah 1914), Rich County v. Bailey, 154 P. 773 
(Utah 1916), and Mammoth City v. Snow, 253 P. 680 (Utah 
1926), in support of their position that local governments 
have been permitted to challenge the validity of the Commis-
sion's actions. Each of the above cases involved a challenge 
by the plaintiff county to the Commission's apportionment of 
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state-assessed property from one county to another, and such 
app0rtionrnent was then used by the counties, as required by 
statute, to apportion the taxpayer's property among taxing 
districts within the counties. The issues, therefore, were 
strictly procedural and related to tax questions that in-
volved concurrent state-county jurisdicton. In contrast, the 
issues in the present case do not involve such concurrent 
jurisdiction and do not have an impact on the performance by 
the counties of their statutory duties. The Juab County case 
is also distinguishable on the ground that it involved a 
request by the county to force the Commission to grant it a 
hearing. Again, and most importantly, the issue of standing 
to sue was not raised or discussed in any of the above cases. 
Appellants also rely on a number of cases in which coun-
ties or local officials appealed to this Court from decisions 
of the Commission which reversed decisions made by local 
boards of equalization. See, Board of Equalization of 
Kane County v. State Tax Commission, 50 P.2d 418 (Utah 1935): 
Baker v. State Tax Commission, 520 P.2d 203 (Utah 1974): Salt 
Lake County v. State Tax Commission, 532 P.2d 680 (Utah 
1975). These cases, however, are distinguishable on the 
grounds that the question of standing was never raised and 
each of them involved taxpayer appeals to the Commission in 
connection with property valued and assessed by the counties 
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and for which the counties had specific statutory duties 
observed by the Court in Salt Lake County v. Tax Commiss__!_o" 
•these matters had their beginnings in applications r:., 
county-assessed property owners] with the Salt Lake County 
Board of Equalization." 532 P.2d at 680. When the Commis-
sion ruled in favor of the taxpayers, the counties appealed 
to the courts, seeking to uphold the county board of equali-
zation decisions. The present case on the other hand, in-
volves property required by statute and the Constitution to 
be valued by the Commission only; the counties have no statu-
tory involvement or responsibilities in connection with such 
valuations or subsequent appeals therefrom. 
In Harmer v. State Tax Commission, 452 P.2d 876 (Utah 
1960) , cited by appellants before the lower court but not in 
their brief on appeal, elected county officers, in their 
capacity as taxpayers and county officials, brought a declar-
atory action against the Commission for a determination, 
among other thinqs, of whether the Commission's method for 
revaluing county-assessed properties was valid. As far as 
the claims of the plaintiffs as taxpayers were concerned, the 
challenge of the Commission's revaluation procedures was con-
sistent with the statutory rights granted to taxpayers. In 
addition, the issues in the case related to matters subject 
to concurrent state-county jurisdiction, since the subject 
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properties were initially valued by the counties. The plain-
tiffs also asked the Court to delineate the powers of local 
officials and the general powers of the Commission to super-
vise local officers and boards, matters that are easily dis-
tinguishable from those before the Court in the present case. 
In the remaining case of Washington County v. State Tax 
Commission, 133 P.2d 564 (Utah 1943), cited by appellants, 
the standing issue again was not raised. The case involved a 
writ of prohibition relating to a property tax exemption, and 
several taxpayers were also parties to the action. As with 
other cases cited by appellants, this case does not deal with 
a county's right to challenge action, which by statute and 
the Constitution, is required to be taken exclusively by the 
Commission, and for which the only statutory right of appeal 
is granted to the taxpayer, not the counties. It dealt 
solely with the constitutionality of a tax statute and was in 
the nature of a declaratory judgment. 
In summary, the County has not cited any Utah cases in 
which this Court has reviewed the question of whether or when 
a county or its officials have standing to sue the Commission 
and, more particularly, whether a county has standing to sue 
the Commission to challenge its valuation of those properties 
which fall under its exclusive jurisdiction. When courts of 
neighboring states have confronted these and similar issues, 
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they have held unanimously that absent a statute to the c0n 
trary, counties lack standing to challenge Commission act,." 
Finally, as a matter of policy, the counties and the 
mission should not be adversaries in the administration of 
the tax laws. Both are charged with specific responsibili-
ties relating to valuation and assessment of certain classes 
of taxable property in the state, and the Commission is 
specifically charged with overseeing the counties in the per-
formance of their duties with respect to property valuations 
and assessments. A reading of the tax statutes in effect 
when Salt Lake County commenced the present action shows that 
the legislature concluded that it was neither necessary nor 
desirable for the counties to attempt to reverse those statu-
tory roles. Even with the passage of Senate Bill 208 in 
1983, the legislature did not intend that the counties have 
wholesale authority to challenge all Commission action. It 
limited the counties' rights in this regard and provided 
specifically that an owner of state-asessed property or a 
county dissatisfied with a valuation made by the Commission 
could seek a hearing before the Commission on or before April 
10th of the current tax year. If the taxpayer or the county 
disagreed with the Commission's decision, it could appeal 
that decision to the district court. It does not give a 
county the right to file counterclaims and crossclaims like 
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those asserted by the County in the present action where a 
taxpa1er challenges the constitutionality of its property 
tax, nor does it grant the right to a county to initiate 
court proceedings before the matter is submitted to the Com-
mission for a hearing. To hold now that the appellants have 
standing to maintain their crossclaims would be contrary to 
the express statutory provisions in effect when those cross-
claims were filed, and would not even be supported by the new 
legislation. It would also go against the position adopted 
by this Court that assessments are susceptible of correction 
only where the legislature has provided a remedy by statute. 
See Juab County v. Bailey, 140 P.764, 766 (Utah 1914). The 
state law in effect at the time of commencement of the pre-
sent action provided a judicial remedy for correction of 
assessments and valuations and assessments to taxpayers only, 
not to the counties and their political subdivisions. The 
counties had other means of input into Commission procedures 
and decisions, including annual seminars and other meetings 
to which county representatives were invited, committees or 
panels appointed by the Governor to review valuation proce-
dures, and various informal meetings. Neither Salt Lake 
County nor other counties within the state took advantage of 
those opportunities to offer suggestions as to how they felt 
certain classes of state-assessed properties should be 
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valued. The County, therefore, should not now be grante,l 
standing to maintain legal action to challenge such valua 
tions. 
POINT III 
APPELLANTS' CROSSCLAIM WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED 
BECAUSE IT WAS NOT FILED TIMELY. 
In Juab County v. Bailey, 140 P.764, 766 (Utah 1914), 
cited by appellants in their brief, this court held that the 
counties were barred from bringing an action challenging 
county by county apportionments made by the Commission of 
state-assessed property, where the action had been brought 
•after the apportionments [had] been made, the rate of taxa-
tion [had been] fixed in accordance with such apportionments, 
and all levies [had] been made pursuant thereto." Based on 
this holding, appellants in the present case should be barred 
from bringing any crossclaim to challenge property valuations 
made by the Commission for 1981, since that crossclaim was 
not filed until June 25, 1982, long after the valuations had 
been made, the tax rates had been fixed, and the taxes had 
been levied in accordance therewith. See Utah Code Annotated 
S 59-10-26 (1953, as amended) (Property taxes to be paid by 
November 30 of each calendar year). 
This Court further held in Juab County that the counties 
cannot commence action under the tax statutes after the 
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Limitations period applicable to property owners has run. 
140 P. at 76G. In this regard, Section 78-12-31 of the Utah 
Code requires that all actions for taxes paid under protest 
be within six months after payment of the tax. 
Kennecott, the taxpayer in the present case, paid its tax 
under protest on November 30, 1981. Nearly seven months 
passed, however, before appellants filed their crossclaim. 
That crossclaim is therefore barred by the statute of 
limitations. 
POINT IV 
THE UTAH CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES PRECLUDE 
APPELLANTS FROM OBTAINING THE INFORMATION 
SOUGHT BY THEIR SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION. 
Appellants' second cause of action is legally defective 
on the further ground that it seeks to have the Court inter-
fere with the taxpayers' constitutional right of privacy and 
it violates the Archives and Records Service Information 
Practices Act. In Redding v. Brady, 606 P.2d 1193 (Utah 
1980), this Court recognized a constitutionally based right 
of privacy with respect to records maintained by governmental 
agencies. In defining the scope of that right, the Court 
stated: 
It seems sufficient for our purpose herein to 
say that what the right of privacy protects is to be 
determined by applying the accepted stan-
dards of social propriety. This includes those 
aspects of an individual's activities and manner of 
living that would generally be regarded as being of 
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such personal and private nature as to belong to 
himself and to be of no proper concern to others. 
The right should extend to protect against intrusion 
into or exposure of not only things which might 
result in actual harm or damage, but also to things 
which might result in shame or humiliation, or 
merely violate one's pride in keeping his private 
affairs to himself. 
Id. at 1195. In a concurring opinion in California Bankers 
Association v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21, 94 S.Ct. 1494, 39 
L.Ed.2d 812, Justice Lewis F. Powell indicated that financial 
information should be protected by the constitutional right 
of privacy: 
Financial transactions can reveal much about a per-
son's activities, associations and beliefs. At some 
point, governmental intrusion upon these would 
implicate legitimate expectations of privacy. 
The Commission has taken the position that the records 
furnished to it by property owners, particularly information 
relating to income, are most confidential and private. To 
release such information to political subdivisions and their 
officers who have no right to value or supervise the valua-
tion of property assessed by the Commission, would have a 
detrimental effect on the Commission's ability to carry out 
its assessment work and would needlessly reveal to the vari-
ous county officials and employees information obtained in 
confidence, without any reasonable purpose being served. 
Based upon the taxpayer's legitimate expectation of privacy 
with regard to certain financial information furnished to the 
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'01nmission, the confidentiality of that information should be 
upheld in order to prevent its dissemination to those who do 
not need it for the performance of their duties. In this 
regard, the records sought by appellants have no bearing on 
the county's ability to carry out its assessments and should 
be used only by the Commission absent a specific statute to 
the contrary. 
Utah State law in effect when the County filed its cross-
claim also precludes the disclosure of the information sought 
by the County's second cause of action. The Archives and 
Records Service Information Practices Act found in Utah Code 
Annotated, § 63-2-59, (1981 Supp.), governs the main-
tenance and retention of state records and documents. The 
legislative intent behind the Act, among other things, is to 
prevent abuse of personal or confidential information. Id. 
S 63-2-6. With respect to individual rights under the Act, 
Section 63-2-85.4(4) provides: 
No confidential or private data shall be used other 
than for the stated purposes nor shall it be dis-
closed to any person other than the individual to 
whom the data pertains, without express consent of 
that individual, except that next of kin may obtain 
information needed to acquire benefits due a 
deceased person. 
Tax returns and other tax data furnished to or gathered by 
the commission are classified as private data and, according-
ly, may be used by the Commission only for the purpose of 
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assessing taxes. Appellants in the present action have p•0 
sented no evidence that such records have not been so class 1 
fied. Since the counties have no statutory or constitutional 
duties or responsibilities with respect to the valuation of 
state-assessed properties, they are prevented by the Act from 
having access to such data without the express permission of 
the person supplying the data or to whom it pertains. In 
short, the constitutional right of privacy and the Utah 
Archives and Records Service Information Practices Act bar 
disclosure to appellants of the information sought by their 
second cause of action. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the crossclaims of the county and the 
other appellants in this case represent a serious attempt to 
challenge the authority of the Commission, as well as the 
entire system developed by the Commission under existing 
statutes over a period of many years, for the valuation of 
state-assessed properties. Appellants seek through the liti-
gation process to participate in all matters involving the 
authority, functions, policies and procedures of the Commis-
sion with respect to state-assessed properties, whereas Utah 
statutes in effect when the crossclaim was filed grant exclu-
sive responsibility to the commission in that area. To per-
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,nit appellants to become participants in the valuation of 
state-assessed properties, without a statutory right to do 
so, by means of the litigation process would make it impos-
sible to carry out the Commission's functions without very 
substantial costs, inefficiencies and other problems. It 
would also overburden the courts with issues that should pro-
perly be addressed by the legislature after full considera-
tion of necessary safeguards and other matters, as was done 
in the 1983 legislative session. 
In short, the courts are not a proper forum for the 
claims of a few county officials who are trying to assail the 
general procedures and methods used by the Commission in 
valuing state-assessed properties. Other avenues of input by 
the counties were available when the crossclaim was filed and 
should have been utilized if appellants had wished to chal-
lenge the procedures, policies and valuation techniques of 
the Commission. Appellants' claims are matters to be con-
sidered by the legislature, as is well illustrated by the 
limited standing laws passed by the legislature in 1983, or 
to be handled by administrative procedures expressly provided 
for by regulation or by special hearings conducted under 
order of the governor's office. Appellants chose not to 
-33-
avail themselves of those opportunities and should not 1, 
considered to have standing to pursue those claims in co'", 
Respectfully submitted this 29th day of July, 1983. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEA!J 
Special Assistant Attorneys Gen-
eral and Attorneys for Respon-
dent Utah State Tax Commission 
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I !1( it J, L-t. 1 t1 fy tli<:1 t l scr\'ecl tv..•c; copies of the fore-
111 Uric,f 1 f Ul,fcnd0nt Cr 11 ss Defendant Utah State Tax 
C 1ssiun b; mailing the same, postage prepaid, respectively, 
tc. Thc.,cJ•.·rc C ctn nun, Bi 11 Themas Peters and John G. Avery at 
JO Place, Suite 1000, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111; 
ancJ to Keith E. Taylor and John F. Waldo at Parsons, Behle 
Latimer, 185 South State #700, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
Dated this 29th day of July, 1983. 
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ASSESSMENT OF PRCPERTY AMENDMENTS 
1983 
GENERAL SESSION 
By Cary G. Peterson 
K. s. Cornaby 
Jack M. Bangerter 
Ivan M. Matheson 
Karl G. Swan 
AN ACT RELAT lNG TO PROPERTY TAX ASSESSMENTS; REQUIRING THE 
STATE TAX COMMISSION TO FURNISH INFORMATION RELATING TO 
THE ASSESSMENT OF STATE ASSESSED PROPERTIES AND SALES 
RATIO STUDIES TO COUNTY ASSESSORS. 
THIS ACT AMENDS SECTION 59-5-52, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, AS 
LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 71, LAWS OF UTAH 1982, SECTIONS 
59-5-54, 59-5-55, AND 59-5-56, CODE ANNOTATED 1953, 
AND SECTION 59-5-109.6, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, AS 
ENACTED BY CHAPTER 233, LAWS OF UTAH 1981. 
Be it the Legislature of the State of Utah: 
Section 1. Section 59-5-52, Utah Code An.notated 1953, ae 
last amended by Chapter 71, Laws of Utah 1982, ie amended to 
59-5-52. By the !1ret day of April the state tax 
comm1asion shall aseees, ae valued of January l, all property 
required by law to be aeeeaeed by it. Immediately thereafter 
the O'Wner, or operator ae provided in aection 59-5-65 (2), o! 
property ao aeee&aed and the aeeesaor for the county in which 
property ie located ahall be notified of such aaaee•ment. 
Section 2. Section 59-5-54, Utah Code Annotated 1953, ie 
amended to read: 
S. B. No. 184 
59-5-54. The state tax comrn1ss1on must prepare each yeeir 
a book, to be called "Record Aseeeement of Railroads and Ct.her 
Companies," in which must be entered each assessment, except 
assessments of mines, made by it, either 1n or bot.h 
in writing and printing, and the apportionment thereof to the 
•everal counties. In such book must be entered the names of 
the railroad, car, atreet railroad, telegraph, telephone and 
other 11nes and of all public ut1l1ties assessed by the tax 
comrn1ss1on, the names of the corporations to which, or the name 
of the person or association to whom, the same were aeeessed, 
the whole number of miles of the person or association to 
whom, the same were aseeseed, the whole number of miles of the 
railroad, car, street telegraph, telephone lines and 
other lines in the &tate, the number of miles in each county, 
the total assessment of all auch property, and the amount of 
the apportionment of such total assessments to each county. 
The record assessment books and the information upon which the 
assessments and apportionments are calculated shall be 
available for review by a county assessor, upon request. E&ch 
agent. employee, or other person acting under the control of a 
county assessor is sub1ect to the standards and requirements of 
confidentiality in effect for the state tax commission and may 
not release any confidential proprietary information about a 
taxpayer if auch person knows, or has reason to believe, that 
release of the information would significantly competitively 
confidentiality requirements of this section may be imprisoned 
for a period not to exceed six months, fined in an amount not 
to exceed $500, or both. In addition, such person shall be 
dismissed from county office or employment, as the case may be, 
and ie disqualified from holding county office or emplo)'!!lent 
for a period of five years. 
Section 3. Section 59-5-55, Utah Code Annotated 1953, i• 
amended to read: 
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59-5-55. The state tax comn11esion must prepare each year 
a book to be called "Record Assessment of Utility Companies," 
which must be entered the names of every person, 
organizat1on or corporation engaged in any utility business, 
the value of all the tangible and intangible properties of 
said persons or companies doing business within the state of 
Utah upon which they are entitled to earn a fair return; 
together w1th such other lnformation as the state tax 
commission may determine 
The value of the tangible propert1es of the public 
util1ties with1n the state of Utah which are to be recorded in 
the book to be called "Record Assessment of Public Utilities," 
shall be determ1ned as follows: The comm1ssion shall each 
year copy in said book from the last volume of the book known 
as "Record of Valuation of Utility Compan1es," prepared by the 
publlC service comm1esion, the valuations of the tangible 
properties of every publ.1c utility doing business in th1s 
state which said properties are located :-Within the boundaries 
of Utah. Said valuation so recorded in the record of 
valuations of utility companies and copied by the commission in 
the book known as of Assessments of Utility 
Companies," shall be accepted as the true and actual value of 
the tangible properties of aa1d utilities in Utah, and the 
ccmrr.i ssion Bhal 1 asse-ss t,.\..,e of 1.:.'tili ty 
from the valuations •o recorded in the •ame proportion to the 
recorded valuation as the assessed valuation of other tangible 
properties aimilarly aasesaed bear to their actual value. The 
record assessment books and the information upon which the 
assessments and apportionments are calculated ah all be 
available for rev1ew by a county assessor, upon request. Each 
agent, employee, or other person acting under the control cf a 
county assessor i• eubject to the etandards and requirement• cf 
confidentiality in effect for the state tax commisaion and may 
not release any confidential proprietary information about a 
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taxpayer if euch pereon knows, or has reason to 
releaee of the infonnat1on would s1qn1f1cantly compet1t1vely 
dieadvantaqe the turpayer Any person who violates the 
confidentiality requirements of this 
for a period not to exceed six months fined in an amount _not 
to exceed $500, or both. In add1t1on, be 
d1smiseed from county office or employment as the case may be, 
and ie disqualified from holding county office or employment 
for a period of f1ve years. The com.m1ss1on shall 
(fttrtfteFl!'ere consider the record of valuations of 
utility companies prepared by the public service comm1ssion 
every Wtalii wktek •e 
wttft!ft tfte aft8 eeeeee eet8 
ae aeeeeeee e£ 
e£ .U..e etete ef Wteft] in determining utility 
rates in valuing the property for tax purposes. 
Section 4. Section 59-5-56, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is 
111nended to read: 
59-5-56. The state tax tommies1on must prepare each year 
a book called the "Occupation Tax and Aesessment Book of 
Mines," in which must be entered all occupation taxes fixed 
and the assessment of all mines in the state eul:iject to 
aseeaament by it and in which book must be specified in 
separate columns and under appropriate heads: 
(1) Owner of mine. 
(2) Name and description and location of the mine. 
(3) County in which it io oituated. 
(4) Net proceeds in dollars, 1! a metalliferous mine. 
(5) Number of tons of ore mined vhether by the owner, 
lessee, contractor or otherwise. 
(6) Amount received for ore and metal if aold; i! not 
aold the value thereof. 
(7) Value of mine. 
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( 8) \.'a 1 ue of the ma::h1nery 
( 9) Value of supplies and other personal property. 
(JO) Value of improvements. 
(ll) Value of machinery, property and aurf ace 
improvements having a value separate and lndependent of all 
such mines or mining claims assessed by the state tax 
comm1ss1on, and the names of the owners of the aame. 
Together w1 th such other informat1on as the tax comm1ss1on 
may determine 
The record assessment books and the information upon which 
the assessments and apportionments are calculated shall be 
available for review by a county assessor, upon request. Each 
agent, employee, or other person act1ng under the control of a 
county aeseseor is subject to the standards and requirements of 
confidentiality in effect for the state tax commission and may 
not release any confidential proprietary infonnation about a 
taxpayer if such person knows or has reason to believe, that 
release of the information would eigruficantly competitively 
disadvantage the taxpayer. Any person who violates the 
confidentiality requirements of this section may be imprisoned 
for a period not to exceed six months, fined in an amount not 
to exceed $500, or both. In addition, such person shall be 
dismissed from county office or employment, as the case may be, 
and ie disaualified from holdina county office or emolo'V'?Tlent 
for a period of five years. 
Section 5. Section 59-5-109.6, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
as enacted by Chapter 233, Laws of Utah 1981, is amended to 
read: 
59-5-109.6 ( J) Each year, to assist it in the 
ef 
evaluation of appraisal perfonnance of taxable real property, 
the etate tax commission ehall conduct studies and publi•h .!!!9 
d1etribute to each county aeseesor and others the reeulte of 
etudiee of the relationahip between the aaaessed and market 
-s-
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values of property to determine assessment-sales rat1os for 
each type of taxable real property within taxing districts. 
Every gales-ratio study shall use the stat1st1cal method known 
as the "weighted mean"' to determine the of 
values, and the "weighted coeff1c1ent of var1&t1on" tc 
determine the degree of d1 spers1on or var1at1on 
"weighted tn£:Bn. Aeeeesors may provide aales information 
(2) The state tax comrn1ss1on shall, before Decern.be1 1 of 
each even-numbered year, order each county to adJust or fBctor 
itl!!I assessment rates using the most current etud1es so that 
the assessment rate in each county is in accordance with that 
prescribed in eect1on 59-5-1. Such adJuetrnent or factoring may 
include an entire county, geographical areas within a county 
and aeparate classes of properties. The etate tax commission 
shall also order corrective action where significant value 
deviations occur es indicated by the coefficient of dispersion. 
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At.' ACT REL . t..TING TO HE.t.FINCE EEFC>?E THE TD: COMM!SSJOl\ Af\D Tr..x 
AFFEJ..:..S FF\OM OF TriE ST.L.TE TA>: COMMlSSION TO THE 
DJSTFlCT COUFT OF THE SUFRE>:E COUFT, PRO'JJD!NG THAT A 
com..::y W}L,SE TAX RE\'ENUES ARE AFFECTED BY THE DECISION MJ\Y 
BE Pl.RTY IN THE HEAF!NG MAY APPEAL OR PETITION FOR 
RE\.' IE\<.' OF THE DEC l S 
THJS ACT AMH.'DS SE:T!ON 59-7-:2, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, AS 
LAS: .ri.¥.[;,':)ED BY CHAP:'EF 71, LAWS 1982, AA"D SECTION 
UTAH ANt.'cTATED 1953, AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 
80, LAWS OF UTAH 19-7 
re Jt enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah: 
Section Se:t1on 59-7-12, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
last amended by Chapter 71, Laws of Utah 1982, lS amended tc 
read: 
59-7-12 If the owner of any property assessed by 
the state tax commJss1on f te or any county 
WJth showing of reasonable cause ob1ects to the assessment 
hy either may, before the tenth day 
of April, apply to the commission rte kave 
't ekaii eet e for! hearing 
tke ef tweftty-
Say ei eerreet er 
S. B. No. 208 
!:t 7 ee ee te 
W!:U\ tll.e ef etl'le!' !:ri etl'.!te) g_c,tL 
or thE- c-o·.mty upcn _cf __ 
ehal 1 be a} lowed tc _b_e ___ p_a.!...!_y_ at any under th!: s 
the 
ob1ect1on from Aprll )0 until Arr.ll 22. At the the tax 
comm1ss1on may 1ncrease, lower or susta1n the assessment, if 
the cornrn1ss1on an error in the or if lt is 
.. w1 th other s1m11ar1 y 
Section Section 59-24-2. Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
enacted by Chapter 80, Laws of Utah 1977, is amended to read: 
59-24-2. (1) W1th1n 30 days after notice of any dec1s1on 
by the state tax commission rendered after a formal hearing 
before any aggrieved party appearing before the 
or whose tax revenues are affected by the dec1s1on may 
appeal or pet1t1on for rev1ew to the tax of the 
district court located in the county of res1dence or pr1nc1pal 
place of business of the affected taxpayer or, in the case of a 
taxpayer whose are assessed on a statewide basis, to the 
tax division of the third Judicial district court in and for 
Salt Lake County. 
(2) In all cases, whether or not proper under subsection 
( l), any aggrieved party appearing before the state tax 
commit.blO:i. or county whose reveDl:.eE" are 
decis1on may appeal or petition for review a decision rendered 
after a formal hearing of the commission to the tax division of 
the third judicial district court in and !or Salt Lake County 
within the specified 30 days following notice of such decision. 
(3) In the a taxpayer may waive review and 
trial de novo in the tax d1vis1on of the district court and, 
within the specified 30 days fol!ow1n9 the required notice, may 
aeek review by the Utah Supreme Court upon writ of certiorari. 
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If a te.xi:-a:t-er chooGes to waive r19ht of 
by tax dn:1s1or1 of the dlStr1ct court and •ppl1es 
f:::r ...:: :'t in tt.e Sui: :er-e tf,e taxpayer or affected 
£C-.1r.+,y m-.1st (a) state in the appl1cat1or. for the writ that the 
taxpayer 2J __ affected coun:__J is ...... a:'.·1ng the right of rev1e•• and 
trial de novo in the tax d1vls1on of the dlstr1ct court and (b) 
ccmply the provisions of sec:1ons 59-5-78, 59-13-48, 59-
14A-77, 59-15-:6 and'or 59-lE-lJ as thcugh seeking =eview in 
the tax d1'.·1.:J.on of the dJ.str1ct court A county whose tax 
re .. ·enues are affectej by de::sJ.cn being reviewed shall be 
allowed to b€ a party in interest in the proceeding before the 
Supreme ::curt 
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